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Abstract
This paper endogenizes the market structure of an economy with heterogeneous
agents who want to form bilateral matches in the presence of search frictions and when
utility is non-transferable. We depart from standard matching models where all agents
are assumed to be in a unique meeting place by assuming the existence of innitely
many meeting places and allowing each agent to choose which meeting place to be in.
The market is thus allowed to be segmented into di¤erent meeting places, and agents
not only get to choose who to match with, but also who they meet with. We show that
in equilibrium all market structures feature perfect segmentation where agents match
with the rst person they meet. All these market structures have the same matching
pattern, implying that the value of search to each agent is the same. Although perfect
assortative matching cannot be obtained in equilibrium, the degree of assortativeness
is nevertheless greater than in standard models.
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1 Introduction
The issue of how heterogeneous agents form matches was rst examined in the works of
Gale and Shapley (1962) and Becker (1973) in a frictionless environment. Recent work has
extended this analysis by incorporating search frictions so as to capture the idea that it
takes time to meet someone.1
Implicit in these models is the assumption that agents are all searching within a market-
place. If one considers a model with homogeneous agents and non-transferable utility, this
assumption is natural: in the marriage market context, as no male (female) is better than
any other male (female) a priori, the expected payo¤ to a female (male) from matching
with any male (female) is the same. However, once ex ante heterogeneity is introduced,
assuming that search is conducted in one marketplace is no longer innocuous.
Suppose there is an objective ranking of both males and females. Since agents use a
reservation strategy, i.e., each male (female) will have a lowest female (male) type he (she)
will agree to match with, an agent typically spends time meeting people he will never
match with, either because the person he meets is below his reservation type or his own
type is below the reservation type of the person encountered. As agents do not necessarily
match with the rst person they meet, they impose a congestion externality on each other.
Standard matching models, by assuming that all heterogeneous agents search randomly in
one marketplace, do not address this congestion externality.
Take a standard search model, which has been examined in McNamara and Collins
(1990), Burdett and Coles (1997) and Bloch and Ryder (2000). They show that when
agentstypes are distributed over the interval [x; x] and the utility a type x agent receives
from matching with a type y agent is y, in equilibrium, agents partition themselves into
distinct classes where agents in each class match only with other agents in their class.2
That is, a class structure is formed. It is clear that agents from each class are imposing
a congestion externality on all other classes. Intuitively, an easy way to get around this
externality will be to take all agents in a given class and put them in their own marketplace,
1A non-exhaustive list includes McNamara and Collins (1990), Lu and McAfee (1996), Burdett
and Coles (1997), Burdett and Wright (1998), Eeckhout (1999), Bloch and Ryder (2000), Shimer
and Smith (2000), and Smith (2002).
2Smith (2002) and Eeckhout (1999) show that more generally a class structure is also ob-
tained when the utility an agent gets from matching is log-modular, i.e., u(x1; y1)u(x2; y2) =
u(x1; y2)u(x2; y1).
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so that they meet only other agents from their class. This way, each agent faces the same
expected quality of a match, but will now be matching at a faster rate.
However, this reasoning assumes that agentsreservation strategies are left unchanged,
which is not true in equilibrium. Take agents from the rst class who are now in their
own marketplace. The highest type agents in this new marketplace now have a di¤erent
reservation strategy because the composition of agents in this new marketplace is di¤erent.
In fact, they will be more picky about whom they agree to match with by increasing their
reservation type. In other words, in this new marketplace consisting only of class 1 agents,
we get the result that a class structure is obtained once again. Now take the new class 1
agents in this marketplace. They are again in a marketplace with agents they will not agree
to match with if they were to meet. Why not form their own marketplace to increase their
matching rate? If we continue reasoning this way, a natural question is whether this process
goes on ad innitum so that each type of agent is in its own marketplace?
This paper builds on the existing literature by assuming the aforementioned utility
specication, and extends it by allowing for the existence of innitely many marketplaces.
We characterize steady-state equilibria when the distribution of types of agents in each
marketplace is known to everyone, each agent is free to decide which marketplace to search
in, and once he has decided to go to a particular marketplace search is conducted randomly
there. Moreover, an equilibrium has to be such that it is not possible to create a new
marketplace that would attract people.
In our paper, by allowing for many marketplaces, and for each agent to choose which
marketplace to position himself in, segmentation arises as an equilibrium phenomenon.
Second, by making the distribution of agents in each marketplace public knowledge, agents
can make an informed decision as to which marketplace to search in. Hence, search is no
longer forced to be completely random and each agent can direct his search towards the
best marketplace for himself. Agents not only get to choose who to match with, they also
choose who they meet with.
We show that all equilibria feature perfect segmentation in that agents match with the
rst person they meet, and all equilibria have the same class structure, which is nite. This
implies that perfect assortative matching cannot be obtained in equilibrium. Yet our model
does not have the congestion externality that is present in standard search models since
agents match with the rst person they meet. And since there is only one implied class
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structure that is supported in equilibrium, the value of search for each type of agent in any
equilibrium is the same.
In light of our result, standard matching models can be interpreted in two ways: the
entire economy is studied, as we do, but everyone is searching in a unique marketplace, or
one can think of these models as studying one marketplace in isolation with the types of
agents taken as given. In the former, our results imply that standard results with partial
segmentation like Burdett and Coles (1997) are no longer equilibria when segmentation is
allowed. In the latter case, our model, by endogenizing the market structure, pins down
the set of types in each active marketplace.
Examples of segmentation of markets are plentiful. In the marriage market, the rich
and beautiful tend to search for a partner among the similarly rich and beautiful, and do so
by going to fancy bars and cafés, whereas the Average Joe goes to the neighborhood pub to
meet his Average Jane rather than fancy bars because he knows he would not be able to nd
a match there.3 Although our paper is closest to the marriage market because of the non-
transferable utility assumption, segmentation of markets is observed in other markets and
our analysis is thus relevant. In the labor market for fresh graduates for instance, the most
desirable employers do not search randomly but among a subset of students from the best
schools, and the best students from the best schools tend to concentrate their search among
these rms, thereby forming their own search market; the next-best rms and the next-best
students, knowing they cannot match with the best students and rms respectively, form
their own marketplace, and so on. By obtaining segmentation as an equilibrium outcome,
our paper is able to shed some light on the mechanism behind the segmentation observed
in these markets.
The organization of our paper is as follows. The following section presents the standard
model where everyone is in one marketplace. Section 3 sets up the model where there are
multiple marketplaces and agents are allowed to choose where to search in. In section 4 we
construct an equilibrium with perfect segmentation. Section 5 characterizes all the other
equilibria. Section 6 discusses the main points and assumptions of the model, and section
7 concludes.
3Some might say that fancy bars charge higher prices than local pubs for drinks; segmentation is
thus done at least partially through price discrimination. We would argue that a man looking for
a match can have two beers at a fancy bar rather than four beers at his local pub if he is really
searching for a match.
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2 The Standard One Marketplace Model
2.1 Setup
Time is continuous. The economy is populated by a unit mass of innitely lived agents
who discount the future at rate r > 0 and who wish to form bilateral matches. Agents are
characterized by their type x which belongs to X = [x; x], with x > 0. All agents agree on
how to rank one another, and agentstypes are revealed upon meeting each other. When
a type x agent matches with a type y agent, the former receives utility y; the utility an
agent receives therefore depends entirely on his partner.4 This implies that all agents prefer
to match with the highest possible type. When unmatched, an agent enjoys a ow utility
normalized to zero so that being matched yields a higher ow payo¤ than being unmatched.
All agents start their life unmatched, and because of search frictions it takes time for
agents to meet. More specically we assume agents meet according to a Poisson process
with parameter , where this parameter is constant, i.e., independent of the measure of
unmatched agents searching for a partner.5 Although being unmatched is undesirable, it
does not necessarily mean that an agent will match with the rst person he meets. This is
because he may prefer to wait for a better match, so meetingis distinct from matching.
When an agent matches, he leaves the pool of searching agents forever and we assume
that he is replaced by a clone. This clones assumption ensures that G, the cumulative distri-
bution of singlestypes, is stationary and independent of the matching pattern.6 Although
not essential for our results, we assume that G has full support and is di¤erentiable on X,
and g denotes its density function.
Like Becker (1973), Shimer and Smith (2000), and Smith (2002), among others, this
paper is a partnership model. Although numerous matching models consider two sides of
the market, a partnership model is equivalent to a model with two sides being symmetric
and restricted to using symmetric strategies. Obviously the partnership model employed in
this paper cannot explain non-symmetric behavior, but we leave it for future research.
4We assume this utility specication to simplify the exposition; a more general utility function
can be adopted where a type x agent receives u(x; y) when matching with a type y agent, with
u (x; y) log-modular. Jacquet and Tan (2004) adopt this more general specication and show that
the results are una¤ected.
5Section 6.2 discusses the implications of increasing returns in the meeting technology.
6This assumption can be relaxed via introducing an exogenous inow of new agents to endogenize
the distribution of unmatched agents as in Burdett and Coles (1997) and Smith (2002). In the former,
it is shown that this can result in multiple steady-state distributions of singles.
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2.2 The Steady-State Equilibrium
We focus on steady-state equilibria where agents use stationary strategies. For two agents
with types x and y to match when they meet, x needs to accept y and y needs to accept
x. That is, there needs to be a double coincidence of wants. The problem a type x agent
faces is: given the set of types of agents 
(x) who accept a match with him, what types of
agents should he accept? By standard arguments, u(x), the value of being unmatched for
agent x, satises
ru(x) = 
Z

(x)
Max fy   u(x); 0g dG(y). (1)
An agent x will accept a match with y if and only if y  u(x),7 that is, he uses a reservation
strategy. If we consider two agents with types x1 and x2, x1 > x2, agents accepting a type x2
agent also accept a type x1 agent. Therefore an agent with type x1 cannot fare worse than
an agent with type x2, meaning that u(x1)  u(x2) and therefore reservation strategies are
non-decreasing in type. Proposition 1 states the existence of a unique equilibrium, which
we call the Burdett-Coles (BC ) equilibrium, and characterizes its structure.
Proposition 1 For any G, when there is one marketplace, an equilibrium exists and is
unique. It is characterized by a nite, and strictly decreasing, sequence of reservation strate-
gies fubcj gJ
bc
j=1, u
bc
Jbc
 x, where ubc0  x, and for all j  1, ubcj solves
ubcj =

r
Z ubcj 1
ubcj
[G(ubcj 1) G(y)]dy. (2)
All agents with attributes in X1 = [ubc1 ; x] share the same reservation type u
bc
1 , and for all
j > 1, all agents with attributes in Xj = [ubcj ; u
bc
j 1) share the same reservation type u
bc
j .
We will not formally prove the proposition as it will only reproduce proofs available
in the literature, but let us lay out the intuition. Consider rst the x agents. They are
accepted by everyone since they are the highest type. As reservation strategies are non-
decreasing, and x agents have u (x) as their reservation type, all agents whose types are in
the interval [u (x) ; x] are also accepted by everyone. But since ones type a¤ects ones payo¤
only through whom one can match with, agents who have the same opportunity set will
have identical reservation strategies, and thus u(x) = u (x)  ubc1 for all x 2

ubc1 ; x

. These
7We use the convention that if an agent is indi¤erent between staying unmatched or matching
with an agent, he chooses to match.
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agents therefore match only with each other, and we say that they are class 1 agents. Now
consider agents of type (ubc1   ") for " > 0 arbitrarily small. They will like to match with
agents in class 1, but will be not be accepted as they are below class 1 agentsreservation
type. However, all other agents not in class 1 will accept them since they are the best
agents not in class 1. By the same argument as above, one can nd a reservation type ubc2
such that all agents with attributes in [ubc2 ; u
bc
1 ) choose the same reservation type u
bc
2 , and
therefore match only with each other, thereby forming the second class. It is easy to see
from here that this reasoning applies to agents with types in [ubc3 ; u
bc
2 ) and so on, until one
reaches a class with reservation type equal to or less than x.
We therefore obtain a class structure fXjgJ
bc
j=1 in this BC economy where agents whose
types fall in the interval Xj belong to the same class, and they are class j agents: two agents
from that class will match if they were to meet, and none of these agents will match with
any agent not in their class, either because they are below the reservation type of the agent
met, or that agents type is below their own reservation type. Note that agents in the last
class, Jbc, have a reservation type weakly less than x.
This class structure makes it clear that with search frictions and ex ante heterogeneity,
agents will not generally be able to match with all types of agents in the economy, but only
with a subset. And agents who will never match with each other impose an externality
on each other by reducing the rate at which they meet agents they will actually match
with. In the present case of a class structure, if one could partition the economy into
several marketplaces with each marketplace populated by agents of a given class, keeping
the acceptance strategy of the members of each class unchanged, there would be a Pareto
improvement: each agents expected quality of a match is unchanged and he matches at
a higher rate since he then matches with the rst person he meets. Hence, agents of
di¤erent classes no longer impose externalities on each other as they are searching in di¤erent
marketplaces. However, when agents are split this way their reservation strategies will
correspondingly change to reect the new distribution of types in their new marketplaces.
3 The Generalized Model with Multiple Marketplaces
From now on the economy consists of countably many marketplaces.8
8We will show that there are only a nite number of classes in equilibrium, and thus allowing for
the set of meeting places to be a continuum would not modify the results about the class structure.
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We assume that agents can move freely between marketplaces at no cost, and agents of
the same type are allowed to search in di¤erent marketplaces. The distribution of types in
each marketplace is assumed to be public knowledge so that each agent makes an informed
decision when choosing which marketplace to go to. We maintain the assumption of random
search within each marketplace.
We denote by Xn the set of types searching in marketplace n, with supremum xn and
inmum xn; and by Gn and !n the cdf of types and the mass of agents searching in mar-
ketplace n respectively.9 A market structure M is dened as the sequence fXn; Gn; !ngNn=1
where N is the number of active marketplaces. Given a market structure, each type of
agent has a value of search in each of the active marketplaces, and we denote by un (x) the
value of search in marketplace n for a type x agent. Hence, un(x) satises
run(x) = 
Z

n(x)
Max fy   un(x); 0g dGn(y), (3)
where 
n(x) is the set of types of agents in marketplace n willing to match with an agent
of type x. We dene an equilibrium as follows:
Denition 1 A steady-state equilibrium is a market structure M = fXn; Gn; !ngNn=1
and a level of utility u(x) for each type x 2 X such that:
(i) un (x)  u (x) for all n, un (x) = u (x) if x 2 Supp (Gn), where un (x) satises (3);
(ii) G (x) =
PN
n=1 !
nGn (x); and
(iii) there does not exist a distribution G0 and a function  : X ! [0; 1] such that
(a) for all x,
(x) =
8<: 1 if u0(x) > u(x)0 if u0(x) < u(x);
and (x) 2 [0; 1] if u0(x) = u(x); where u0 (x) satises (3) for n = 0 with
G0(x) =
R x
x (y)dG(y)R x
x (y)dG(y)
; and
(b) there exists an x where u0(x) > u(x).
The rst part of the denition states that in equilibrium each agent searches in the best
marketplace for himself. Since we have not restricted agents of the same type to search
9 In this paper we use superscripts to denote the meeting place and subscripts to denote the class.
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in the same marketplace, two or more marketplaces can yield the same value of search to
agents of a given type, and one can have un(x) = u(x) with no type x agent searching in
marketplace n.
The second equilibrium condition is simply a market clearing condition in that if we
were to put all agents searching in all the active marketplaces into one marketplace we
would get back the initial population.
As this paper is interested in segmentation as an equilibrium phenomenon, in the spirit
of that we allow new marketplaces to be created. So in equilibrium, it must be true that
there is no payo¤ in creating a new marketplace, which is what part (iii) of the denition
of equilibrium deals with. More precisely, it is not possible to select a group of agents with
types in X0  fx j (x) > 0g, such that all of them are no worse o¤ than in their original
marketplaces, and if agents of a given type are strictly better o¤ there then all agents of
that type are searching in this new marketplace. The last requirement, (iii)(b), imposes a
non-redundancy condition since the new marketplace must make at least one type of agents
strictly better o¤.
One can think of this economy as having competitive market makers who can each create
a marketplace, like in Moen (1997). Each market maker can advertise the desired types
he would like to have in his marketplace, but just as he cannot force an agent to go to his
marketplace, he also cannot exclude agents from his marketplace. Although an agent can
choose to search in any marketplace, he will self-select into the one which he expects to
be the best for himself, and in equilibrium this marketplace is the one the market maker
intended him to go to. Furthermore, in equilibrium it must not be possible for a market
maker to be able to create a new marketplace which will attract agents.
As an example, think of marketplaces as bars or clubs, and market makers as bar or
club owners. In this economy with multiple bars, agents of the same type need not all
be in the same bar. But in equilibrium, it must be true that no agent will like to switch
bars. And at the same time, if there is room for a bar owner to step in to create a new
bar that would attract some agents because at least some of them can be made strictly
better o¤, and all other agents intended to be there no worse o¤, then this cannot be an
equilibrium. So equilibrium in this economy also requires that there is no payo¤ in creating
a new marketplace which will attract some agents.
In the standard model with one marketplace a class was dened as the set of agents
9
who match with each other if they were to meet. Once we introduce many marketplaces
this denition still holds, but now two agents of the same class need not be in the same
marketplace. Given an equilibrium market structure M , there will be a class structure
within each marketplace n by applying Proposition 1.10
4 A Perfect Segmentation Equilibrium
Since one important motivation of this paper is to address the ine¢ ciencies in standard
random search papers resulting from the search externalities that agents who meet but will
never match impose on one another, we rst want to nd out if there exists an equilibrium
where agents do not su¤er such externalities. We call these equilibria Perfect Segmentation
Equilibria or PSE. In this section we show that a PSE indeed exists, and we do so by
constructing one. We focus here on constructing an equilibrium with the simplest possible
market structure in that all agents of the same type search in the same marketplace (As-
sumption 1, or A1 thereafter) and the set of types of agents searching in a given marketplace
is either a singleton or an interval (Assumption 2, or A2 thereafter).
Under A1 and A2, if the set of types searching in marketplace n, Xn, is an interval, the
distribution of types is
Gn (x) =
G (x) G (xn)
G (xn) G (xn) for all x 2 X
n,
and the mass of agents in marketplace n is !n = (G (xn) G (xn)). Since both the cu-
mulative distribution and the mass of agents can be recovered from Xn for each active
marketplace n, a market structure in this case is simply dened as M = fXngNn=1. Our
strategy in constructing an equilibrium satisfying A1 and A2 is to characterize market
structures where all agents search in the best marketplace for themselves before checking
for which of these there is no payo¤ to creating a new marketplace.
4.1 Characterizing the Market Structure
Let us rst consider agents of type x and let us assume that they are in a marketplace by
themselves, say marketplace 1. From equation (3), when X1 = fxg, the reservation type of
10The proof of proposition 1 in this case needs to be generalized to allow the set of types in a given
meeting place to be non-connected. We do not provide the formal proof, but the intuition should
su¢ ce to convince the reader that the result carries over.
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x agents in this marketplace is
u1 (x) =

r + 
x,
which is strictly less than x as long as  is nite, i.e., as long as there are search frictions.
Any agent with type x 2 u1 (x) ; x could therefore match in marketplace 1 since his type
is higher than the reservation type of the best agents. And given that x agents are the best
agents around and that the rst marketplace is populated exclusively by x agents, the value
of search among all active marketplaces is the greatest in marketplace 1, provided that an
agent can match there. It follows that if X1 = fxg, agents with types in u1 (x) ; x are not
searching in their best marketplace, which cannot be true in equilibrium.
More generally, under A1 and A2 a PSE must be such that the marketplace where
the top agents search, say marketplace 1, is made up of one class, i.e., u1(x) = u1  x1
for all x 2 X1, and it either contains the whole population, in which case x1 = x  u1,
or not, in which case x1 = u1 > x. To show this, following the argument used to derive
the class structure in the standard one marketplace case, one knows that all agents with
types in

u1 (x) ; x

and who search in marketplace 1 accept to match with one another,
and therefore all belong to the same class, and u1 denotes their common reservation type.
If u1  x, then there is only one class in the economy, all agents have a value of search
of u1, and x1 = x. Then we have already found a market structure M = fXg inducing
perfect segmentation and where all agents search in the best marketplace for themselves.
The more interesting case is when u1 > x. Then there is more than one class in the
economy, and it must be that u1 = x1. Since we are constructing a PSE, x1  u1. Moreover,
x1  u1, because if not an agent with type x 2

u1; x
1

would obtain a value of search there
of u1, which is the greatest value of search he can hope for since the distribution of types
in marketplace 1 rst-order stochastically dominates the distribution of types of any other
marketplace. Therefore, x1 = u1.
In both cases u1 must satisfy
ru1 = 
Z x
u1
(y   u1) dG(y)
1 G (u1) . (4)
Suppose there exists a u1 > x. Then given this u1, the marketplace containing the best
agents not in the rst class, say they are in marketplace 2, must also contain one class since
we are looking for a PSE. The common reservation type of agents in this second marketplace,
and class, is thus u2  x2. Following the earlier reasoning we used in constructing the rst
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class, it must be clear that if x2 > u2  x, then agents with types in [u2; x2) would not be
searching in the best marketplace for themselves. Hence, for market structures satisfying
A1 and A2, if the second marketplace is to contain one class, then the set of types of agents
searching in marketplace 2 is either [u2; u1) when u2 > x, or [x; u1) when u2  x, i.e.,
X2 = [max fu2;xg ; u1), where in both cases u2 solves
ru2 = 
Z u1
u2
(y   u2) dG(y)
G (u1) G (u2) .
Reasoning recursively, it is clear that a market structure under A1 and A2 featuring per-
fect segmentation and where all agents search in the best marketplaces for themselves is
characterized by a nite sequence fujgJj=1, uJ  x, where for all j, uj solves
ruj = 
Z uj 1
uj
(y   uj) dG(y)
G (uj 1) G (uj) , (5)
with u0  x. Agents with types inXj form the j-th class of the economy, whereX1 = [u1; x],
Xj = [uj ; uj 1) for all 1 < j  J . The sequence is nite because for all j  2,
uj <


r + 

uj 1 <


r + 
j
x,
where the rst inequality is from (5) and the second inequality from successively applying
the former. This implies that so long as  is nite, there exists a nite K such that
(=(r + ))Kx  x, and therefore there is a nite J  K such that uJ  x < uJ 1.
The next lemma (whose proof is in the Appendix) establishes the existence of such a
sequence of reservation types, gives a su¢ cient condition for uniqueness, and compares these
reservation types with those in the BC economy.
Lemma 1 For any G, and for market structures satisfying A1 and A2:
(i) there exists a sequence fujgJj=1, uJ  x, where for all j, uj solves (5), with
u0  x;
(ii) if G is such that dbx(z; y)=dz  1, where bx(z; y) = R yz xdG(x)=(G(y)   G(z)),
then the sequence is unique; and
(iii) if Jbc > 1, then uj > ubcj for all j  Jbc, and therefore J  Jbc:
The intuition behind the possible multiplicity of classes lower bounds is as follows.
Suppose that the right tail of g is very thin so that few people are at the top of the
distribution, and that we have found u1 such that all agents with types in X1 = [u1; x] form
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exactly one class when in one marketplace by themselves. Thus, u1 solves (4), which can
be rewritten as
u1 =

r + 
bx(u1;x),
where bx(z;x) = R xz ydG(y)=(1 G(z)) is the average type in marketplace 1 when its inmum
type is z and all agents with types above z search in marketplace 1. Suppose g is such
that there are a lot of agents with types just below u1, when those agents are added to
marketplace 1, the marginal type x1 decreases, and the average type will at rst decrease
by less. The reservation type of the agents originally in the rst marketplace thus falls,
but by less than the marginal type, and therefore two classes appear. But because a lot of
agents with lower attributes are being added, it is possible that eventually the average type
in marketplace 1, bx(x1;x), drops faster than x1 does. In this case the reservation type of
the top agents decreases faster than x1, and therefore another value eu1 < u1 can be found
such that all agents with types in [eu1; x] form exactly one class when in one marketplace
by themselves. From here one can intuit that if G is such that the average type bx(x1;x)
always decreases by less than the marginal type x1, then there is a unique u1 such that
u1 = (= (+ r)) bx(u1;x).11 This is the condition given in part (ii) of lemma 1. It turns
out that a su¢ cient condition for this to be true12 is that (1 G) is log-concave.13 ;14
When there is more than one class in the BC economy, Lemma 1 establishes that the
reservation type of a class in a BC economy is strictly lower than the reservation type of
the corresponding class in a market structure that is part of a PSE. The intuition for why
this is so is the following. In the BC economy with more than one class, agents meet other
agents they will not match with, whereas in a PSE since each marketplace consists of only
one class, and hence class 1 agents can be more picky about who they match with. For
all other class j agents, their reservation types are increasing in the upper bound of their
marketplaces, so uj > ubcj for all j  Jbc. Therefore, there are at least as many classes in
11We would like to thank Espen Moen for suggesting to us this interpretation using marginal and
average types.
12The proof is available from the authors upon request.
13A function is said to be log-concave if its log is concave.
14With an endogenous distribution of singles and a unique marketplace, Burdett and Coles (1997)
show that a su¢ cient condition for uniqueness of the class structure is that (1 G) be log-concave.
It is worth noting this is also su¢ cient for uniqueness when the overall distribution of unmatched
agents is exogenous but there are many marketplaces and there is perfect segmentation. In their
paper the endogeneity of the distribution of singles comes from the matching pattern, whereas in
this paper it originates from the endogeneity of the set of types in a given marketplace.
13
an economy with segmentation than in the BC economy.
When there is only one class in the BC economy, it might be possible to nd a u1 > x
such that if all agents with types in [u1; x] search in one marketplace, then they all have the
same reservation type u1, but this cannot be guaranteed. For instance, as established in
lemma 1, if (1 G) is log-concave the average type bx(x1;x) always decreases by less than
the marginal type x1. Hence, since (= (+ r)) bx(x;x) = (= (+ r))x < x, and ubc1  x,
i.e., (= (+ r)) bx(x;x)  x, then u1 = (= (+ r)) bx(x1;x) < x1 for all x1 2 (x; x].
4.2 Creation of a New Marketplace
Denoting by u1 the highest rst class lower bound solving (4), we will now show that among
the lower bounds solving (4), only u1 is such that no class 1 agent can be made strictly better
o¤ from the creation of a new marketplace 0. Consider the market structure M = fXngNn=1
such that X1 = [u1; x] with u1 solves (4), and u1 < u1. It is clear that there is a payo¤
from creating a new marketplace with G0 and  such that
 (x) =
8<: 1, for x 2 X0,0, otherwise, ; and G0 (x) = G (x) G (u

1)
1 G (u1)
, for all x 2 X0,
where X0 = [u1; x]. All agents meant to search in marketplace 0, i.e., those with types in
X0, enjoy a value of search there of u1 which is strictly greater than the value of search in
marketplace 1, u1. And since the lower bound of marketplace 0 is also the reservation type
of its inhabitants, the value of search there for all other agents is zero since they would not
be able to match there. Hence, agents with types not in X0 have a greater value of search
in their original marketplaces, which is consistent with  (x) = 0 for all x =2 X0.
We now show that if X1 = [u1; x] no class 1 agent can obtain a greater value of search
than u1 in a new marketplace 0. We have two cases to consider, whether marketplace 0
contains one or more classes. Let us rst consider the former case, and suppose that it
is possible to nd a G0 and a function  such that all agents initially in marketplace 1
and whose types are in X0 are better o¤, with some of these agents strictly better o¤, i.e.,
u0 (x)  u1 for all x, and u0 (x) > u1 for some x, x 2 X0 \ [u1; x]. But since marketplace 0
contains one class, u1 < u0  u0 (x) for all x 2 X0. It is straightforward to see then that all
agents with types in

u0; x

must be intended to search in marketplace 0 since they would
anyway be accepted by all agents with types in

u0; x
 \X0, and they would enjoy a value
of search of u0 > u1 in the new marketplace. Hence, given that the set of types in this
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new marketplace must include all agents with types in

u0; x

, X0 must either be

u0; x

or X, and  (x) = 1 for all x 2 u0; x. But since u1 is the highest solution to (4), it is not
possible to have u0 > u1 for all x 2 X0 where this new marketplace contains only one class.
If, however, the new marketplace contains two classes or more, it can also be shown (see
the proof of the next lemma which is in the Appendix) that no agent with type in [u1; x]
would fare strictly better in the new marketplace than in marketplace 1. We thus have the
following lemma:
Lemma 2 If a market structure M = fXngNn=1 is such that X1 = [u1; x], then there does
not exist a G0 and an  satisying part (iii) of the equilibrium denition for which u0 (x) > u1
for some x 2  X0 \X1.
The intuition for lemma 2 as to why class 1 agents when X1 = [u1; x] cannot fare strictly
better in the new marketplace is that since there are now agents they will not match with
when they meet they must be less picky about whom they match with, i.e., their reservation
type is no higher than u1.
We now turn our attention to the other classes, and marketplaces. If we denote by u2
the highest of the u2 solving (5) for u1 = u1, it is clear that for all other possible reservation
types for the second class a new marketplace can be created for all agents with types in
[u2; u1) and all these agents are strictly better o¤ there. So only u2 can be an equilibrium
lower bound.
Since Lemma 2 established that if a market structure is such that X1 = [u1; x] it is not
possible to create a new marketplace that would make some class 1 agents strictly better
o¤, we will now show that if a market structure is such that X1 = [u1; x] and X2 = [u2; u1),
then it is not possible to create a new marketplace 0 that can make some of these class 2
agents strictly better with none of them being worse o¤. If we rst consider the possibility of
creating a new marketplace not containing any agent whose type is in [u1; x], we can follow
the reasoning used for class 1 to show that it is not possible to create a new marketplace 0
yielding a value of search greater than u2 to any agent with type in [u2; u1).
But if we now consider creating a new marketplace 0 which contains some class 1 agents,
could some class 2 agents be made better o¤ in the new marketplace? It can be shown in
this case (see the proof of the next lemma which is in the Appendix) that this is not possible.
We then have the following lemma:
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Lemma 3 If a market structureM = fXngNn=1 is such that X1 = [u1; x] and X2 = [u2; u1),
then there does not exist a G0 and an  satisying part (iii) of the equilibrium denition for
which u0 (x) > u2 for some x 2
 
X0 \X2.
The intuition for this result is the following. If some class 1 agents are to search in
this new marketplace 0 then they should be no worse o¤ in it than in marketplace 1.
This implies that these agents do not match with any agent of type below u1 in the new
marketplace either. Hence, class 2 agents do not get to match with better type agents than
in marketplace 2 by searching in the new marketplace, and on the contrary they get to meet
agents they will not match with, and this can only drive down their reservation type.
Having shown that class 2 agents cannot do better than being in their own marketplace
where the reservation type of these agents is u2, given u2, we can solve for class 3 agents
highest lower bound u3, and so on, until we reach the lower bound uJ  x. This sequence
of lower bounds fujgJ

j=1 for the J
 classes is such that each agent searches in his best
marketplace, and there are no payo¤s from creating a new marketplace.
We thus have the following proposition:
Proposition 2 The market structure M = fXngJn=1 and levels of utility u (x) = un
for x 2 Xn, all n, where X1 = [u1; x], Xn =

un; un 1

for all n = 2; :::; (N   1),
XJ =

x; un 1

, and such that un is the highest solution to
run = 
Z un 1
un
(y   un) dG(y)
G
 
un 1
 G (un) ,
uN  x < uN 1, is a PSE. The number of active marketplaces is nite, and J  Jbc.
5 Other Equilibria
We have constructed a PSE satisfying A1 and A2, and we now want to consider all possible
market structures, i.e., those not satisfying A1 and A2 and also where some agents do not
necessarily match with the rst person they meet. Before showing which market structures
can be equilibrium market structures we show that even when A1 and A2 are relaxed, all
market structures where agents search in their best marketplace induce an economy-wide
class structure, i.e., there exists a sequence of disjoint intervals fXjgJj=1 such that agents
with types in Xj match with each other if they meet, but they do not match with any agent
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whose type in not in Xj . Let us start with the rst class. It must naturally contain the
x agents, and we know that reservation strategies are non-decreasing, so u (x)  u (x) for
all x. If an agent with type x 2 [u (x) ; x] searches in a marketplace with value of search
u (x) < u (x), then he has a protable deviation by joining a marketplace containing x agents
since he will be accepted by everyone with types in [u (x) ; x], and will therefore enjoy a
value of search of u (x) there. Denoting u (x) simply by eu1, we then have that all agents
with types in X1 = [eu1; x] must share the same reservation type eu1, and they all belong
to the same class. Repeating the argument recursively, it is clear that a market structure
M such that no agent wishes to change marketplace must display an economy-wide class
structure fXjgJj=1 such that X1 = [eu1; x], Xj = [euj ; euj 1) for all j  2, euJ  x.
We then have the following proposition which establishes that in equilibrium all agents
match with the rst person they meet (the proof is in the appendix).
Proposition 3 An equilibrium must feature perfect segmentation.
The intuition for this result is as follows. For simplicity, let us consider market structures
satisfying A1 and A2 where at least one marketplace has more than one class. Consider
M = fXngNn=1 such that Xn = Xn for all n < K < J, and marketplace K of M contains
more than one class. But for this to be possible, the lower bound of K must be xK < u

K .
If the relative mass of agents in the classes of K, except for the rst, is zero, then all these
agents have a value of search in K which is 0 because the probability they will meet someone
they can match with is 0, and hence they must prefer another marketplace. So the relative
mass of agents in the classes of K, except the rst, must be strictly positive, in which case
the reservation type of the rst class in K, uK1 , will be strictly lower than u

K since these
agents now have a strictly positive probability of meeting agents they will not match with,
and hence are less picky. Hence, a marketplace 0 can be created for agents with types in
[uK ; u

K 1), which makes all these agents strictly better o¤.
Since market structures where some agents do not match with the rst person they meet
have been ruled out, we are left with considering market structures where agents of the same
type can search in di¤erent marketplaces and type sets are not necessarily intervals, and
yet agents match with the rst person they meet.
Lemma 4 Let M = fXn; Gn; !ngNn=1 be a perfectly segmented market structure where
agents search in the best marketplace for them. Then there exists a market structure
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cM = f bXng bNn=1 equivalent to M in that all agents fare the same in both cases.
Because we are considering market structures featuring perfect segmentation, the sets
of types of the marketplaces class 1 agents search in are such that [n2 1Xn = [eu1; x], where
 j denotes the set of marketplaces containing agents in class j. From (3), eu1 is such that
for all marketplaces n 2  1,
reu1 =  Z
Xn
(y   eu1) dGn(y):
Since in this case
P
n2 1 !
nGn(x) = G (x) for all x 2 [eu1; x], multiplying both sides of the
above equation by !n and summing up over all marketplaces in  1, we obtain (4). Hence, a
market structure M where class 1 agents search in more than one marketplace is equivalent
to another market structure M 0, where all agents from class 1 of M are searching in one
marketplace and all the other marketplaces are identical. These two market structures are
equivalent since all classes are identical, and therefore they yield the same level of welfare
for each type of agent.
Repeating the argument recursively, it is clear that for a perfectly segmented market
structure M such that [n2 1Xn = [eu1; x], [n2 jXn = [euj ; euj 1) for all j = 2; :::; (J   1),
and [n2 JXn = [x; euJ 1)  [euJ ; euJ 1), where euk solves
reuk =  Z
Xn
(y   euk) dGn(y), (6)
for n 2  k, we have that, given euk 1, euk also solves (5), which proves the equivalence result.
The intuition behind this result is simple. Rewrite equation (6) for k = 1 as
eu1 = 
r + 
Z
Xn
xdGn (x) ,
where
R
Xn xdG
n (x) is the average type in marketplace n, n 2  1. This implies that all
marketplaces containing class 1 agents have the same average type. Hence, if we were to
put all class 1 agents together in one marketplace, the average type does not change, and
therefore their reservation type stays the same.
There are potentially many market structures that are equivalent in that they imply the
same class structure. For instance, consider a market structure with marketplaces 1 and 2
where X2 is an interval (x2; x2) and X1 = [eu1; x2][[x2; x], they both share the same reserva-
tion type eu1, and all agents of the same type search in the same marketplace. If we assume
that G is uniform, then eu1 = (= (r + ))   x2 + x2 =2 = (= (r + )) ((eu1 + x) =2), and
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all x2 = x   and x2 = eu1+  for some  2 (0; (x  eu1) =2) are possible boundaries for X2.
In this case, there are a continuum of ways to split the rst class into two marketplaces,
each having the same average type as the original marketplace. And if we further consider
splitting the rst class in more than two marketplaces, and allow agents of the same type
to search in di¤erent marketplaces, the possibilities expand even more.
Since we have shown that there is no payo¤ in creating a new marketplace when the
market structure is M, market structures equivalent to M are also equilibrium market
structures, and all these equivalent market structures share the same class structure. Take a
market structure M = fXn; Gn; !ngNn=1 such that for any active marketplace k, Xk  Xj
and (= (r + ))
R
xdGn (x) = uj for some j, and G (x) =
PN
n=1 !
nGn (x). Then M is an
equilibrium market structure. On the contrary, all other market structures not satisfying A1
or A2 cannot be part of an equilibrium because they are equivalent to perfectly segmented
market structures that are not equilibrium market structures. Hence, even though the set
of equilibrium market structures is potentially large, there is a unique equilibrium class
structure and all agents fare the same in all equilibria. These results are summarized in the
following proposition:
Proposition 4 A market structure M = fXn; Gn; !ngNn=1 is an equilibrium market struc-
ture if and only if its implied class structure is that implied by M, and therefore for all
x 2 Xj, j = 1; :::; J, u(x) = uj .
We view the above proposition that says, in equilibrium, a number of active marketplaces
can yield the same value of search to some types of agents, as interesting. This can help
explain why, for example, there are so many di¤erent bars or clubs which are very similar
to one another, and where people are indi¤erent to going to any of them, and seem to
randomize on di¤erent nights where to go to.
6 Discussion
6.1 Comparison to the Search and Matching Literature
In frictionless assignment models which were rst studied by Gale and Shapley (1962), when
agents have the same objective ranking over types, as is the case in this paper, the solution
features perfect assortative matching. For instance, the solution to an assignment problem
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with symmetrically distributed males and females features the top male matching with the
top female, the next best male matching with the next best female, and so on.15
Standard search and matching models do not deliver this result of perfect assortative
matching. In particular, for search models which have log-modular utility functions (our
paper uses a special case of this), the class structure result is obtained, where matching
sets are intervals. Hence, there is some form of positive assortative matching among agents,
but it is no longer perfect, unlike in frictionless assignment models. When we introduce
segmentation the degree of positive assortativeness is greater than that of standard one
marketplace matching models. But because of the presence of search frictions sorting is
nevertheless less than perfect.
Several other papers have dealt with market segmentation, but in di¤erent ways. Boses
(2003) paper also considers segmentation of markets and is therefore related, but his model
has only two types of agents (traders), with heterogeneity being in the number of units of
goods the traders can hold on to (either one or two units), and he does not endogenize the
market structure. Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) consider a model with segmentation of
the labor market in which segmentation arises because of technological constraints: to be
productive in a job a worker needs a minimum level of skills, and if a worker is employed
in a rm with a technology below his skill level, he is no more productive than if he had
the minimum skill required. This perfect complementarity between skills and technology
ensures that low type agents do not nd it protable to deviate to marketplaces with
agents of types above theirs, and hence they obtain perfect assortative matching. Lang et
al.s (2005) model of labor market segmentation is a directed search model, and thus is not
directly comparable to ours.
Competitive search equilibrium models of Moen (1997) and Mortensen and Wright
(2002) feature a market-maker who creates marketplaces through posting wages/prices,
thereby allowing each agent to choose which marketplace to go to. As the waiting time
is implicitly priced, agents sort themselves into the correct marketplaces, with the market
tightness adjusting to internalize the search externalities. Search externalities are internal-
15Formally, the only stable assignment rule 	 is such that 8i 2 I with type x(i), the agent he is
assigned to is j = 	(i) such that x(j) = x(i). Obviously it must be that 	(j) = i, or 	(	(i)) = i,
i.e., an agent is his partners partner. This implies the matching sets () are singletons and 8x 2 X,
(x) = x. This is because in a one-sided assignment model, when we split agents into two subsets,
I1 and I2, such that they have the same cdf which is the cdf of the whole population, we obtain the
result since 	 is a measure preserving bijection between I1 and I2.
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ized in our model just like in competitive search models because each agent is able to direct
his search towards the right marketplace.16
Bloch and Ryder (2000) is also related to our work. They consider a matchmaker who,
for a fee, can match agents instantaneously. Agents then choose either to pay the fee and
be matched by the matchmaker or search for a partner in one marketplace with search
frictions. The two main di¤erences between their approach and ours are: we allow for many
marketplaces whereas they consider only two, and in our model search frictions are present
in all marketplaces. Damiano and Li (2004) also consider a matchmaking model, but in
their case the matchmaker can create di¤erent marketplaces, and charge a di¤erent fee for
each of them.
Our paper di¤ers crucially from sectoral models like the ones of Hosios (1990), Davidson
et al. (1987, 1988) and Uren (2003). In these models, each rm belongs to one of two sectors,
and only workers are mobile. The spirit of our model is to allow all agents to move freely
between marketplaces.
6.2 The Meeting Technology
In order to focus on the sorting e¤ects it was assumed throughout the paper that the
meeting technology displays constant returns to scale so that the measure of agents in each
marketplace does not matter for the rate at which agents meet. It is natural to ask if the
results obtained are robust to the introduction of increasing returns, as segmentation then
becomes less attractive since the meeting rate is lower than if everyone is searching in one
marketplace.
To answer this, let us deal with a market structure where all agents in the same class are
in the same marketplace. As long as the increasing returns are not too strong, the results
obtained, apart from the ones about welfare, hold. Consider the case where 0(n) > 0,
where  (n) is the meeting rate in marketplace n when n is the measure of agents searching
in n. If we try to construct a perfectly segmented equilibrium, u1, the lower bound of the
16Our paper is also related to the recent literature that has considered the use of money, either
in the context of a cooperative matching game as in Corbae et al. (2003), or with more than one
meeting place as in Matsui and Shimizu (2005). In these models, preferences are heterogeneous in
the sense that when there are K types of agents, an agent typically consumes good k and produces
good k + 1 (mod K), so there is no objective ranking of types, unlike in our paper.
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rst marketplace and of the rst class must satisfy
u1 =
(1 G(u1))
r
Z x
u1
(y   u1)dG1(y),
which can be rewritten as
u1 =
(1)
r1
Z x
u1
(1 G(y))dy.
In the one marketplace case (1)=1 is replaced by (1) in equation (2). It is then clear
that the ratio (1)=1 is crucial. If it is decreasing in 1, then all the possible equilibrium
lower bounds for the rst marketplace, which are also the equilibrium reservation types
of the rst class, are greater than the lower bound of the rst class when everyone meets
in one marketplace. And since the maximum equilibrium lower bound of a marketplace
with one class is still increasing in its upper-bound, the only equilibrium must be perfectly
segmented, and it displays a larger number of classes than the one marketplace case. It is
easy to show that this analysis carries over for all other classes. This case corresponds to a
meeting technology being less than quadratic.17
It is clear that with increasing returns in the meeting technology the equivalence result
of lemma 4 no longer holds, and market structures where agents of the same class search
in more than one marketplace cannot be part of the equilibrium. To see this, consider our
previous example where the rst class is split between marketplaces 1 and 2 where X2 is
an interval (x2; x2) and X1 = [u1; x2] [ [x2; x], where u1 is the common reservation type of
these agents. If we regroup them in marketplace 1, the meeting rate increases as there are
now more agents searching there. Hence, the top agents of the rst class will increase their
reservation type above u1, and two classes appear. So the highest possible lower bound for
the rst class is obtained when all the agents of that class search in the same marketplace.
It is worth noting that if ()= is constant, which corresponds to the case where the
meeting technology is quadratic, then the class structure obtained for PSE with connected
sets is identical to the Burdett and Coles class structure. In that case the increasing returns
are just enough to o¤set the congestion externality, in that the rate at which agents meet
the righttypes is unchanged whether there is segmentation or not.18 More generally, one
can see that all market structures with connected sets display the same class structure.
17The meeting function is quadratic if the number of matches quadruple when the measure of
searching agents doubles. In this case the probability that an agent meets someone doubles.
18See Teulings and Gautier (2004) for a search and matching model with heterogeneous agents
and a quadratic matching function.
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7 Conclusion
We endogenize the market structure of an economy with heterogeneous agents who want to
form bilateral matches in the presence of search frictions and when utility is non-transferable.
We allow for the existence of innitely many marketplaces and for each agent to choose which
marketplace to be in. In equilibrium all market structures feature perfect segmentation,
and although perfect assortative matching cannot be obtained in equilibrium, the degree
of assortativeness is nevertheless greater than in standard models. Furthermore, all these
market structures have the same class structure, implying that all agents fare the same in
all equilibria.
Appendix
Proof of lemma 1: From (2) and integrating by parts the right-hand sides of (5), we have that
ubcj and uj solve b(ubcj ;ubcj 1) = 0 and (uj ;uj 1) = 0 respectively, where
b (z; y)  z   (=r)Z y
z
(G (y) G (x)) dx, and (z; y)  z   (=r)
Z y
z
G(y) G(x)
G(y) G(z)dx.
(i)We have that (0;x) =   (=r) R x
0
[(1 G(x))]dx < 0 and, by LHospital, that limz!x(z;x) =
x > 0. Hence, since  is continuous, the Intermediate Value Theorem implies that there exists a
u1 =  (x) 2 (0; x) such that ( (x) ;x) = 0. Applying the reasoning recursively, we have that given
uj 1 > x, there exists a uj =  (uj 1), and the sequence ends once we nd uJ =  (uJ 1)  x.
(ii) uj solves uj = (=r)
R uj 1
uj
[(G(uj 1) G(x)) = (G(uj 1) G(uj))]dx, which can be rewritten
as uj = (= (+ r)) bx(uj ;uj 1). We then have T (0;uj 1) =   (= (+ r)) bx(0;uj 1) < 0 and
T (uj 1;uj 1) = (r= (+ r))uj 1 > 0, where T (z; y)  z   (= (+ r)) bx(z; y). Hence, if T is
strictly increasing there exists a unique uj such that T (uj ;uj 1) = 0. Since dT (z; y)=dz = 1 
(= (+ r)) dbx(z; y)=dz, this is guaranteed if dbx(z; y)=dz  1. It follows a unique sequence fujgJj=1
exists if dbx(z; y)=dz  1 for all y 2 (x; x] and z < y.
(iii) It is clear that b (z; y) > (z; y) for all (z; y) 2 ([x; y)X) n (x; x), and b (z; y) = (z; y)
for (z; y) = (x; x). Hence, if ubc1 > x, u1 > u
bc
1 =
b (x) where b (x) is such that b(b (x) ;x) = 0.
Since (z; y) is increasing in z, b (x; y) > (z; y) for x > y, all y  x. It follows that if ubc1 > x,
then u2 =  (u1) > 
 
ubc1

> b  ubc1  = ubc2 , and so on.
Proof of lemma 2: If there is only one class in marketplace 0, the proof has been done in the
main text. For the case where there are two or more classes, suppose u0
 
x0

> u1. It must then be
that  (x) = 1 for x  u0  x0, and hence, X0 is of the form u0  x0 ; x [ Y for some set Y . But
then from (3), u0
 
x0

solves
ru0
 
x0

= 
Z x
u0(x0)
 
y   u0  x0 dG(y) 
1 G  u0  x0+ !0 (Y ) ,
where !0 (Y )  R
Y
 (y) dG (y) is the mass of agents with types in Y searching in 0. It follows that
for all !0 (Y )  0, u0  x0  u1, and for all !0 (Y ) > 0, u0  x0 < u1, which nishes the proof.
Proof of lemma 3: It has been shown in the main text that if the new marketplace does not
contain any class 1 agent then u0 (x)  u2 for all x 2
 
X0 \X2, all G0 and an  satisfying part (iii)
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of our denition of equilibrium. Now suppose that some class 1 agents search in the new marketplace
0, and suppose that at least some agents originally in the second marketplace are strictly better o¤
in the new marketplace, and enjoy a value of search of u0 > u2 there so that  (x) = 1 for all
x 2 u0; u1. However, because class 1 agents cannot be made strictly better o¤, as proven in lemma
2, for them to be in 0 it must be that u0 (x) = u1 for all x 2
 
X0 \X1. Thus, none of these agents
will match with agents with types less than u1. Thus, from (3) the value of search in marketplace 0
for agents with type x 2 u0; u1 is ru0 =  R[u0;u1)  y   u0 dG0(y), which can be rewritten as
ru0 = 
Z
[u0;u1)
 
y   u0 dG(y)
(G (u1) G (u0)) + e!0 ,
where e!0 = !0(X0n u0; u1) is the mass of agents in marketplace 0 with type not in u0; u1. But
there does not exist a u0 > u2 solving the above equation. This nishes the proof. Note that actually
agents originally in class 1 who are now in 0 will actually get a value of search lower than u1 for all 
G (u1) G
 
u0

> 0.
Proof of Proposition 3: Consider M such that some agents do not match with the rst
person they meet. These agents belong to at least two di¤erent classes. Let us consider the one
made of the better agents of the lot, say class j. The value of search for these agents must solve
reuj =  R euj 1euj (y   euj) dGn(y) for all n 2  j . If the market structure satises A1 and A2, then  j is
simply a singleton. If we denote by !n j the mass of agents in marketplace n not belonging to class
j, multiplying both sides by !n for all n, integrating by parts the RHS, and summing up over n, we
obtain
reuj =  Z euj 1euj (G(euj 1) G(x))dx(G(euj 1) G(euj)) +Pj2 j !n j ,
since [j2 jXj must contain the interval with upper bound euj 1 and lower bound euj . Deninge (x; z; !)  x   (=r) R z
x
[(G (z) G (x)) = (G (z) G (x) + !)]dx, it is obvious that for any non-
zero !, e (x; z; !) >  (x; z) for all x for a given z. Moreover, it can be shown that e (x; z; !)
is strictly increasing in x, and since e (x; z; !) < 0 and e (z; z; !) > 0 for z > x, we have that
there exists a solution e (z; !) to e (x; z; !) = 0. It follows that  (z) > e (z; !) for all ! > 0.
Setting z = euj 1, we have that euj =  (euj 1)  euj = e(euj 1;Pj2 j !n j), with strict inequality
if
P
j2 j !
n
 j > 0. Since the relative mass of agents not in class j searching in marketplaces in  j
must be non-zero (otherwise these agents have a zero probability to match in these marketplaces,
which cannot be true in equilibrium since this entails a value of search of zero), we have euj < euj .
Hence, there is a payo¤ of creating a new marketplace 0 since if we choose  such that (x) = 1
for x 2 [euj ; euj 1) and zero otherwise, all agents in this new marketplace are strictly better o¤ there
than in their original marketplace. And no other agent wishes to join.
References
[1] Becker, Gary S. 1973. A Theory of Marriage: Part I.J.P.E. 81 (July/August): 813-46.
[2] Bloch, Francis, and Harl Ryder. 2000. Two-Sided Search, Marriages, and Matchmakers. In-
ternat. Econ. Rev. 41 (February): 93-115.
[3] Bose, Gautam. 2003. Endogenous Segmentation with Heterogeneous Agents.Econ. Theory
22 (September): 457-67.
[4] Burdett, Ken, and Melvyn G. Coles. 1997. Marriage and Class.Q.J.E. 112 (February): 141-68.
24
[5] Burdett, Ken, and Randall Wright. 1998. Two-Sided Search with Nontransferable Utility.
Rev. Econ. Dynamics 1 (January): 220-245.
[6] Corbae, Dean, Ted Temzelides, and Randall Wright. 2003. Directed Matching and Monetary
Exchange.Econometrica 71 (May): 731-56.
[7] Damiano, Ettore, and Hao Li. 2004. Price Discrimination and E¢ cient Matching.Manuscript,
Dept. Econ., Univ. of Toronto.
[8] Davidson, Carl, Lawrence Martin, and Steven Matusz. 1987. Search, Unemployment, and the
Production of Jobs.Econ. J. 97 (December): 857-76.
[9] Davidson, Carl, Lawrence Martin, and Steven Matusz. 1988. The Structure of Simple General
Equilibrium Models with Frictional Unemployment.J.P.E. 96 (December): 1267-93.
[10] Eeckhout, Jan. 1999. Bilateral Search and Vertical Heterogeneity. Internat. Econ. Rev. 40
(November): 869-87.
[11] Gale, David, and Lloyd Shapley. 1962. College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage.
American Mathematical Monthly 69: 9-15.
[12] Hosios, Arthur J. 1990. Factor Market Search and the Structure of Simple General Equilibrium
Models.J.P.E. 98 (April): 325-55.
[13] Jacquet, Nicolas L., and Serene Tan. 2004. Search, Heterogeneity, and Segmentation of Mar-
kets.Manuscript, Dept. Econ., Univ. of Pennsylvania.
[14] Lang, Kevin, Michael Manove, and William T. Dickens. 2005. Racial Discrimination in Labor
Markets with Posted Wage O¤ers.A.E.R. 95 (September): 1327-40.
[15] Lu, Xiaohua and R. Preston McAfee. 1996. Matching and Expectations in a Market with
Heterogeneous Agents. In Advances in Applied Microeconomics, vol. 6, Auctions, edited by
Michael R. Baye. Greenwich. CT: JAI.
[16] McNamara, J.M., and E.J. Collins. 1990. The Job Search Problem as an Employer-Candidate
Game.J. Applied Probability 28 (December): 815-827.
[17] Matsui, Akihiko, and Takashi Shimizu. 2005. A Theory of Money and Marketplaces.Internat.
Econ. Rev. 46 (February): 35-59.
[18] Moen, Espen R. 1997. Competitive Search Equilibrium.J.P.E. 105 (April): 385-411.
[19] Mortensen, Dale T., and Christopher A. Pissarides. 1999. Unemployment Responses to Skill-
BiasedTechnology Shocks: The Role of Labour Market Policy.Econ. J. 109 (April): 242-65.
[20] Mortensen, Dale T., and Randall Wright. 2002. Competitive Pricing and E¢ ciency in Search
Equilibrium.Internat. Econ. Rev. 43 (February): 1-20.
[21] Roth, Alvin E., and Marilda A. Oliviera Sotomayor. 1990. Two-Sided Matching: A Study in
Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
[22] Shimer, Robert, and Lones Smith. 2000. Assortative Matching and Search.Econometrica 68
(March): 343-69.
[23] Smith, Lones. 2002. The Marriage Model with Search Frictions.Manuscript, Dept. Econ.,
Univ. of Michigan.
[24] Teulings, Coen N., and Pieter A. Gautier. 2004. The Right Man for the Job. Rev. Econ.
Studies 71 (April): 553-80.
[25] Uren, Lawrence. 2003. The Allocation of Labor and Endogenous Search Decisions.Manu-
script, Dept. Econ., PrincetonUniv.
25
